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ABSTRACT 
A matter of great concern in the design and operation of multi-engine rocket propulsion systems is the effect of the premature 
shutdown of one engine on the vehicle. This probability that a premature shutdown will cause a vehicle loss is termed ?correlation 
Based on airbreathing experience as well as rocket engine data the best estimate of this ?correlation is made and then applied to 
the overall mufti-engin3 reliability problem to demonstrate its potential effect. At this point, follow-on analyses are pointed out that 
illustrate how any potential failures that may cause a -corretatabW 6
 event can be eliminated; thus bringing this correlation to almost 0. 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Rocket propulsion reliability and safety is a matter of great concern since the Shuttle and Titan incidents. The achievement of 
future space goals hinges on the ability to reliably launch payloads to low earth orbit to support the Space Station, Space Defense 
Initiative and communications needs. While the Shuttle and Titan solid propulsion were responsible forthese incidents we will concern 
ourselves with liquid rocket propulsion in this paper. Current liquid rocket propulsion systems possess an average .96 mission 
reliability (or 4/100 failure rate). In addition, when one of the engines in a system fails, it may affect the operation of the entire vehicle. 
The probability of a premature shutdown causing a vehicle loss is often referred to as correlation. 
Lookingfirst atthe history of engine-caused mishaps across both single, dual, and multi-engine aircraft tells us immediately that 
multiple engines reduce engine caused vehicle losses (Figure 1). This is due to the ability of an aircraft to operate for some time with 
one engine out. Indeed, even with single engine fighters after losing power a pilot very often can land safely. In fact, in the commercial 
arena it is an FAA requirement that an aircraft be able to sustain flight with one engine out - even on takeoff. 
MULTIPLE ENGINES REDUCE ENGINE CAUSED MISHAPS 
USAF & US Navy Experience 
(imnhep./IOOK Acffi) 
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Figure 1
Class A Mishaps Reduced With Multiple Engines 
In order to calculate a reasonable filebf<orrelation for this data we need to combine the mishap rate data (Figure 1) with 
the engine-out rate. In military appli ions thee 70ut rate used was the engine-caused flight abort rate. This abort rate combined 
with the mishap rate as follows:  
*This  work was performed un'er NAS8-3686fth NASA-MSFC approval 
Approved for public release; dIstzjfjpn-Ig'unlimited.
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MISHAP RATE /lOOK AFH ESTIMATED AS ABORT RATE /lOOK AFH FROM AVAILABLE USAF/USNAVY DATA SYSTEMS 
The estimated correlation so calculated is summarized below on Table I, and we see that across all of these dual and 
multi-engine applications the correlation is <1%. 
Table I 
CORRELATION IS < 1% FOR 
USAF AND US NAVY EXPERIENCE 
CORRELATION NC-ENGINE 
F/i 5/F1 00 .9% 
Fl 1 F/TF30 .40/6 
F14/TF30 .4% 
F111B/TF30 .4% 
A-4/A-6/EA6B-J52 .06% 
F-4/J79 .08% 
T38/J85 .03% 
A-i 0/TF34 .070/6 
B52/J57 .8% 
C-i 35/TF33 .3% 
KC-135/J57 .9%
ROCKET HISTORY 
Now let's turn to rocket propulsion systems. Again, we need to know the single engine reliability. This reliability forthe SSME, Fl, 
J2, TITAN, and RL10 is illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 2
Simple Engine cycle Provides Improved Engine Reliability 
Several interesting observations c 
Cycle 
Expander (RL1 0) 
Gas generator 
(Fl, J2, LR87/91) 
Staged Combustion 
(SSME)
an be made from this plot. The single engine reliability seems to be correlated with type of 
rocket engine cycle: 
Characteristics	 Reliability 
Low operating pressures	 .998+ 
& temperatures 
Moderate operating pressures 	 .94-.99 
& temperatures 
High operating pressures	 .93 
& temperatures 
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While this is by no means a perfect relationship; since there are other factors involved such as design philosophy, development 
test philosophy, and quality initiatives, it does indicate an overall trend of higher complexity - lower reliability that intuitively makes 
sense. 
Let's go on to look at rocket propulsion history in terms of engine caused failures and engine caused catastrophic/vehicle losses. 
Table II represents a summary of all data available to the authors in terms of systems, failures, and catastrophic failures. The 
background data was provided by NASA MSFC. The correlation column is simply a ratio of the number of engine—caused catastrophic 
failures to the number of total engine failures. Since rocket engine reliability data (Figure 2) indicates that all rocket engines are not 
created equal; the one way that might be used to combine the data is to average across all systems to indicate an approximate .07 
correlation. Even this average correlation is misleading; however, since it is driven entirely by two systems (Thor/MB3 and Atlas MA3 & 
MA5) and, in fact, is driven by very early design problems in both of these engines. Because of this lack of overall data on 
failures/vehicle losses the SSME ground and flight data from 1982 through 1987 was also analyzed. Based on 51 total shutdown 
events, three of these were of such a nature as to be deemed catastrophic. This then gives a.06 correlation factor (3/15). 
Table II 
ROCKET ENGINE FLIGHT HISTORY 
VEHICLE/ENGINE
NO. ENGINES 
IN SYSTEM NO. FAILURES
NO. CMASTROHIC 
FAILURES COnflELATION 
THOR/MB3 1 3 1 .333 
DELTA/RS-27 1 0 0 0 
ATLAS/MA3&MA5 3 14 5 .375 
CENTAUR/RL10 2 0 0 0 
SATURN/Si-Hi 8 1 0 0 
SATURN/S%-F-1 5 0 0 o 
SATURN/S2-J2 5 1 0 0 
SATURN/S4-J2 1 1 0 0 
SATURN/S4-RL10 6 0 0 0 
SSME 3 1 0 0
ALL ENGINES ARE NOT CREATED EQUAL SO AVERAGING 
ACROSS ENGINES / APPLICATIONS THE CORRELATION a .07 
In summary, while the correlation historically is somewhere around 6-7% the number of events that this is based on is so small as 
to make it reasonable to assume that the correlation is most probably bounded from 0 to 10%, but certainly less than 10%. 
This correlation must betaken into consideration in the calculation of propulsion system reliability. Since each engine ignition can 
be considered as a pass—fail or yes—no event (a Bernoulli trial in statistical terms) the reliability of a propulsion system considering 
correlation can be calculated as:
Rsystem=()p1(I_p)N_i(I_C)N_ 
Nymm = System Reliability	 p = Single engine reliability 
N = # of engines in system o = Correlation 
K = N-engine out capability 
Using this formula, and varying the number of engines in the propulsion system, Figure 3 illustrates the impact of 1 engine out 
capability on propulsion system reliability. Figure 4 illustrates the effect of correlation on propulsion system reliability forvarying single 
engine reliability using a 4 liquid system with 1 engine out capability.
1'
115 
COMPARISON OF ENGINE RELIABILITY
LEVELS, CORRELATION = 0.05 
-	 .rniiiov 
0.85- 
0.80 10 Legend 
SINGLE ENGINE 
0-75-
R=0.99 
0
0.65
4	 5	 5	 16 
NUMBER OF ENGINES IN PROPUI.SION SYSTEM 
Figure 3
Engine Out Capability provides Improved Reliability 
Figure 4
Reduced Correlation Requires Lower Engine Reliability For Same System Reliability 
The importance of correlation and of recognizing those failure modes that may be catastrophic is readily seen in Figure 4. for 
example, byspecifyingthe propulsion system reliability at .995, the single engine reliability that must be demonstrated could vary from 
.97 to .99. What is the importance of this single engine reliability? Well, if a design/development process is initiated to bring the 
correlation to near zero, the number of system tests to demonstrate .995 system reliability is markedly reduced: 
Correlation	 Reliability Demonstrated 	 # Tests w/o failure 
at 90% confidence 	 required 
	
.0	 .97	 76 
	
.04	 .98	 114 
	
.10	 .99	 230 
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Potential 
Failure 
Modes Design Out 
ROCKET ENGINE HEALTH MONITORING SYSTEM (HMS) FOR MINIMIZING CORRELATION 
The approach taken for identifying the requirements for a HMS is shown below: 
Health Management
Systematic Approach to HMS Requirements 
Failure	 Effect 
Identification	 on System	 Corrective Action 
Fault 
Tree
/
Potential
Containment Safety	 Catastrophic. 
Minor Modes 
Failure 
Design	
qDetect and Accommodate 
riaI
HMS 
Failure	 Part 
History Wear 
The approach consists of: 1) failure identification, 2) effecton system (without corrective action) and 3) corrective action (and the 
effect with corrective action). 
Failure identification consists of a Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), review of design criteria 
and failure histories of the components and parts. The FTA is a lops down" analysis that identifies hazards and reviews failure modes 
in the engine system that could cause the hazard. The FM EA is abottoms up" approach that identifies component and subcomponent 
failures and the propagation of the failure through the system into a hazardous condition. The design criteria on limits and failure 
history on life and part failures reviewed to identify additional failure modes. The potential failure modes are then summarized. 
The failures modes are then categorized into three areas: 1) safety (potential catastrophic failures), 2) minorfailures (degradation 
in performance) and 3) part wear (project next maintenance). The minor failures and part wear categories will not be discussed in this 
paper. 
The three approaches for corrective action are: 1) to design out the hazard so as to prevent the failure mode from occurring, 2) 
contain the failure so that it does not get outside of the engine component or outside the rocket engine and cause catastrophic damage 
to another part of the vehicle, and 3) detect the impending catastrophic hazard and take corrective action. 
1. Example of designing out the failure mode. 
Liquid rocket engines incorporate a heat exchanger for providing gaseous oxygen pressurization to the liquid oxygen (LOX) 
propellant tank. A simplified sketch of the system is shown below:
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HEAT EXCHANGER 
With Potential Hazard 
LIQUID GASEOUS OXYGEN TO LOX PROPELLANT TANK 
OXYGE1_]I
	 I 
rHOT GASEOUS HYDROGEN (GH,) 
A single failure (crack in the GH2 line) will allow hot GI-12 to mix with the oxygen and cause a potential catastrophic failure. 
A modification to the heat exchanger design as shown below prevents the catastrophic event: 
HEAT EXCHANGER 
Redesigned 
LIQUID_______	 GASEOUS OXYGEN TO LOX OXYGEN	 PROPELLANT TANK 
HOT GASEOUS HYDROGEN (GH) 
The above design change allows the single failure of the cracked GI-12 line without causing a catastrophic failure. 
2. Example of containing the failure. 
Liquid rocket engines utilize high pressure turbopumps for providing high pressure propellants to the combustion chamber. The 
high pressure turbopumps contain aturbine, consisting of Disks and Blades. Inthe event that a blade fails, the blade may penetrate the 
turbopump housing causing a catastrophic failure. In this failure scenario the energy contained in the blade (stress) is calculated and 
the turbopump housing thickness (strength) is increased to where the appropriate safety margins ensure that a failed blade is 
contained by the housing. 
3. Example of detecting and taking corrective action. 
Liquid rocket engines utilize propellant valves to control the engine cycle. A simplified gas generator schematic is shown below, 
and the main oxidizer valve (MOV) is highlighted. Assume the gas generator to be operating at mainstage (high power) and the MOV 
fails closed: 
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OGCV. FGC' FSOV 
1-1 MOVI
p
UTAMC
PRESSURIZATION
LH&ET
MAIN 
OXIPIZER 
OGCV	 VALVE -	 J. 
FGC  
Gn
FO 
RE. TURBO REP
VALVE 
NAME 
OGCV
LEGEND 
DESCRiPTiON 
GO Oxidizer Control Valve 
FGCV GO Fuel Canfrol Valve 
MOV IteM OzerValve 
FSOV Fuel Shutf Valve 
LOX MET	 LOX TANK 
PRES&IRIZAT1ON 
REGULATOR iI	 I 
REP 
GOX 
o - LOX Propellant 
H - LH,PropeUant 
o	 Procbcts of Combustion 
The valve failure creates a flow blockage that dead-heads the oxidizer pump and forces additional oxidizer into the gas 
generator.	 - 
The following transients illustrate the effect on the gas generator operation for a failed closed MOV: 
Operation Showing Failed MOV Without Corrective Action 
Valve Position	 LOX Turbopump Flow
	 LOX Turbopump Speed 
I. 
0. 
0.0	 0.5	 1.0	 1.5	 0.0	 0:5	 i:o	 1.5	 b.o	 o:s	 1:0	 1.5 TIME - SEC	 TIME - SEC	 TIME - SEC 
Theeflectof the MOVlaIiure, without corrective action, isacatastrophicf allure of theoxidizerpunp. ln this case, the MOVcioses 
In 0.3 seconds with the other propellant valves remaining in the opened position. This causes the pump flow to decrease to avery low 
value, but there Is still power available from the turbuie. The turbine power causes the pumpto overspeed above the burst limit. At the. 
same time, the additional oxidizer fbto the gas generator Increases the oxidizer/fuel ratio towards stoichiometric levels which 
causes a turbine overtemperature. 
The catastrophic failure can be prevented by detecting the MOV position and shutting down the engine before damage can occur, 
as shown in the simulation plots below.
1-
	
I	 LIMIT
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LOX Turbopump Flow
	 LOX Turbopump Speed 
NO CORRECTIL ACIIONI 
N
0.0	 0:5
TIME -, SEC 
Valve Position
(I) 
0. 
E 
0 I 
0. 
S 
0. I 
Operation Showing Failed MOV With Corrective Action 
As the simulation indicates, when all the valves are closed shortly after the MOV fails closed, the turbine energy is reduced, as 
indicated by the reduced turbine speed; hence, preventing a catastrophic failure. 
SUMMARY 
Each potential failure mode identified can be analyzed and the hazard designed out, contained, or detected and accommodated. 
The described approach illustrates that for those potential failure modes that can be conceived and identified there is away to prevent 
the failure becoming catastrophic. 
The described approach does not factor in the random failures that occur after the liquid rocket is in operation. The random failure 
modes considered as part of rocket engine manufacturing process are: manufacturing defects, assembly errors and human errors. In 
order to quantify this randomness one has to review the liquid rocket engine manufactures engine operation history to quantify the 
random failures impact on correlation. 
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